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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD L. GILLMOR, 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLM'OR, 
and C. FRAN·CIS GILLMO·R, 
JR.; ·and the ISLAND RANCH-
ING COMPANY, formerly 




EL \\rOOD B. CARTER dba 
~ERVICE SALT COMPANY, 
Defendant, Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS - RE'SIPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought action in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County to protect lands owned by plain-
tiffs \Yithin said 'County from a continuing ·and 
repetitiYe tresp'ass by the defen1dant in the use of 
a private road traversing lands of pl'aintiffs, and 
to pern1anently enjoin the defendant, his a~gen'ts, 
servants and employees from further use of ~he roa'd. 
DISPOSlTION IN THE LOWER COUR'T 
Plaintiffs' motion for Summ·ary Judgment was 
granted in part and the defen·dant was permanen'tly 
enjoined from hauling salt or other minerals on the 
road traversing plaintiffs' lands. The Court reserv-
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ed two questions for future trial, ( 1) Whether de-
fendant has acquired any prescriptive right person-
ally to an easement over the lands of plaintiffs for 
person·al transportation lby rpassenger car, jeep or 
panel truck, as ·a means of access to the shore of 
Grea:t Salt Lake for the purpose of exploring and 
studying the mineralogical content of the lake and 
lakebed lan~ds. (2) W·hether plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover damages ~against the defen'dant and de-
fendant's bondsmen for injury claimed by plain-
tiffs to :have resulted to the road from defen1dant's 
use of the road for the hauling of salt and minerals 
during ·pendency of the actiDn in Distri1ct Court, dur-
ing whiCh time 'defenrdant was permitted use of the 
road under a bond given pursuant to order of the 
court to !protect the plaintiffs again·st loss result .. 
ing from defendant's use of the road. The Court re-
fused to :declare the road a public road an1d express-
ed the view that it was bound by the determination 
of 'this question in another case involving the same 
road which case was entitled Salt Lake County vs. 
E,dw~ard L. Gillmor, et als., docket No. 137050 in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County. The Court 
decline'd to entertain the motion of the defendant 
to vacate the order of anofuer division of the same 
court requiring defen1dant to ·cease usin'g the road 
traversing 'lan·ds of plaintiffs in lieu of pos1ting a 
$100,000.00 ·bonrd to pro'tect plaintiffs from dam'age 
resulting to their lands or their herds of sheep and 
cattle from defendant's continuing use of the roarct 
during the pendency of the 'action. 
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RELIE~-, SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
I>laintiffs seek affirm,ance of th,at portion of 
the jttdgmen't of the lower court permanently en-
Joining the defendant from use of the road travers-
ing plaintiffs lands in the hauling of salt or other 
minerals and declaring the road not to be 'a public 
road. Plaintiffs seek reversal of that portion of the 
judgment rese1·ving for future tri'al the question of 
\vhether defen,dant has acquired any personal ease-
tnent or right on the road traversing plaintiff's 
lands for personal transportation by jeep, passenger 
car, or panel truck as a means of access 'to the S'hore 
of Great Salt L·ake for the purpose of exploring ~an'd 
studying the mineralogical content of the lake and 
lakebed lands for the reason that from tJhe facts dis-
closed in the deposition of the defendant i 1t is cle·ar 
as a matter of law that 'defendant has no 'such right. 
The Plaintiffs request this 'C,ourt to ·dire'ct the lower 
court 'to enter its order decreeing that the defen1dant 
does not have a personal prescriptive right or ease-
ment. Plaintiffs take the position that the refusal 
by the lower court to entertain defendant's mdtion 
to vacate the action of another division of the lower 
court in requiring 'bond or remaining off the road, 
is not properly before this court for review. 
STATEMENT OF FAC,TS 
Defendant's statement of facts as set forth in 
his brief, consists of an inaccurate summ~ary of the 
District Court docket. The "material facts of the 
case". as plaintiffs understand the facts to be rna-
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terial within the terms of reference proscribed by 
the ;Court Rules, are not to be foun'd therein. Ac-
cordingly, plaintiffs submit their own statements 
of facts. 
Plaintiffs are the owners of lands lying within 
Range 2 West, Townships 1 and 2 N'Orth, Salt Lake 
Ba'se and Meridian, which :are traversed in part 
by a road which commences at a point on the old 
Saltair Speedway in the Southeast Quarter of Sec-
tion 27, :T. 1 N., R. 2 W., (SLB&M, and which road 
proceeds northerly to a point ·at the north boundary 
of Section ·22, 'T. 1 N., R. 2 W., SL'B&M, and which 
then proceeds in a generally n'orthwesterly direetion 
through sections 15, 16, '17 and 18 of T. 1 N., R. 
2 W., in·to Section f3, T. 1 N. R. 3 W. and thence 
to the shore of Great Salt Lake, wh1,ch road has been 
popularly known as 1Jhe Islan·d R~anch Road or the 
Duck C'lu1b Road. (R. 31 Findin'g No. 1) From this 
point fue road crosse·s a causeway on1to Antelope 
Island where it is b'arred by a ga:te which is locked. 
(R. 159 P. 17 L. 19-22, R. 40 The terminus 
of the road is Antelope Island which is private prop-
erty owned by the Island R'anching Company. (R. 
38) T'he road above referred to is a private road 
(R. 38) an'd the defendant admitted in his deposi-
tion that he h~a;d observe'd gates thereon and signs 
indicating that the road was reserved for the use 
of ~he lan1downers and club members. (R. 159- P. 
28, L. 10-13, P. 17 L. 20-22) The defendant 
further admitted that at all times when he has used 
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the road he has observed the gates on the road main-
tained by plaintiffs and has opened them an'd care-
fully replaced them after passing through. (R. 159 
p. 15 L. 4-7, P. 20 L. 1-9) The defendant 
has never hauled salt or other m'ineral from any 
operation of his own or with whi'ch he was associ-
ated over the road in questi~on until he obtained 
some leases from the sta:te whiclh are located at the 
southern tip of Antelope Isl~and below the mean·der 
line of the Lake, an1d these he had acquired only a 
year and a :half prior to the taking of 1his deposi-
tion on October 17, 1962. (R 15'9 P. 40 ·L. 9-11 P. 
10 L. 17, 18; P. 14 L. 17-2'1, P 21 L. 24-30 P. 22 
L. 1-4) The defen·dant does not own any land served 
by the road in question. (R 1'59 P. 3 L. 14-18) The 
defendant has at all times recognized plaintiffs' own-
ership of lands traversed by the road in question 
and of the dominion whic:h the plaintiffs exercise 
o\·er the road. '(R 1'5'9 P. 14 L. 26-'30 P. 15 L. 1-7 
'"~ 15-29 P. 19 L. 6-'8) He tried to get persmission 
of Mr. Olwell of Island Ranching ·Company to get 
by the locke:d gate on Antelope Is'land (R 159 - P. 
17 L. 15-28) and of Frank and Ed Gillmor, two of 
the plain'tiffs for use of other portions of the road. 
(R 159 - P. 38 L. 18-30, P. 3'9 L. 1-11) 
He was not successful for both Ol'well an~d ~he Gill-
mars denied him the ri~ght to use the road. (R 159 
P. 17 L. 23-28 P. 39 L. 9-11) Just as soon ~a;s the 
plaintiffs became aware of ~defendants use of the 
road in questi'on traversin·g their respective lands, 
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for the hauling of salt and other minerals and equip-
ment, they gave prompt notice to defendant by letter 
dated October 16, 1961 over the signature of their 
attorney, Allen H. Tibbals, to cease using the road .. 
(R 159 P. 34 L. 22-30 P. 35 L. 1-7) Defendant ig-
nored the notice given by plaintiffs and continued 
with his 'hauling until December 1961. (R. 159 P. 35 
L. 1-7, 15-18) Defendant commenced h:auling again 
in the spring of 1962 and this action was promptly 
commen·ced by the plaintiffs to enjoin the defen-
dant from the continuing trespass. (R 159 P. 35 
L. 19-25) R. 1-11) By stipulation the Court permit-
ted the defendant to use the road until October 1962 
under a $'500.00 bond posted by defendant in lieu 
of yielding the use of the road pending the outcome 
of the litigation. (R 8-11) In October 196'2, after 
hearing the motion of the Plaintiffs, the court per-
mitted the continued use of the road by defendant 
pending the determination of the suit but required 
an increase in the bon·d to $2'500.00. (R 18, 21, 25, 
31-35) In the spring of 1963 defendant was barred 
from use of the road unless he posted a bond of 
$100,000.00 which was required by the Court to 
protect the plaintiffs from loss which might be suf-
fered by them and their livestock comp'any due to 
the defend·ant continuing to haul through their lamb-
ing and grazing groun·ds in the season of heaviest 
use by plaintiffs. (R. 52-56, 59, 60) Throughout 
the entire period of litigation defendant has nev~r 
shown any evidence of a right to use the road In 
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question. The record is totally devoid of any proof 
of a right in defendant to traverse the lands of plain-
tiffs though defendant claimed to have traversed 
the road to the lakeshore in a passenger car, jeep 
or panel truck, since 1934 when he became interest-
ed in minerals, for the purpose of prospecting and 
testing the mineral content of the lake. (R 159 P. 22 
L. 16-18, P. 19, L. 8-28) 
A la\v suit was commen'ced during the pendency 
of this litigation, by Salt Lake County as plaintiff, 
seeking to have the road in qu·estion declared a pub-
lic road. This case docketed in S·alt Lake County 
District Court as case number 137050 joined the 
plaintiffs herein as defen·dants. The county case was 
disn1issed with prejudice on stipulation of the par-
ties. (R. 106, 107) 
Based on the defendant's admissions in his 
deposition, the lack of proof of any n·ature to sup-
port defendant's contention that he had a prescrip-
tiYe right, and the dismissal with prejudice of th·e 
claim of Salt Lake County th!at the road was a pub-
lic road, the plaintiffs filed a motion for Summary 
Judgment and supported the same with affidavits 
in addition to the record. (R 36-44 inc.) The Court 
after a hearing thereon granted the motion in part 
and entered a summary judgment denying defen .... 
dant any right to use the road traversing plaintiffs 
lands to haul salt or other minerals but reserved 
for future determination after trial the question 
of whether defendant had a right to make personal 
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use of the road for his own transportation to and 
from the lakeshore an·d also the question of the plain-
tiffs claim of damages. (R 106-108) 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs concede the correctness of the action 
of the court below in reserving the question of the 
dam·ages to which plaintiffs may be entitled, if 
any, resulting from defendants use of the road 
pending the outcome of the litigation, as the issues 
to be determined thereon do involve disputed issues 
of fact. Accordingly no appeal has been prosecuted 
from this portion of the decision. Plaintiffs are con-
vinced th·at the Court correctly granted the injunc-
tion restraining defen·dant from further use of the 
road traversing plaintiff's lands for hauling salt 
or other minerals. Pl!aintiffs believe the Court erred 
in not also determining that ·defendant had no right 
to the use of the road for any purpose whatever, 
and believe the Court should have restrained de-
fendant from :any further use of the road for any 
purpose. It is in support of this position that plain-
tiffs will direct their :argument in this Court. to 
Plaintiffs fail to perceive the relevancy (j{ the 
·determin·ative issues involved in the case, of the ~argu­
ments put forth by the defendant/in his brief. These 
matters ·appear to be colla1teral and of little conse-
quence if the court below ·correctly decided the pri~­
cip·al issues before it. Plaintiffs therefore present 
their answer to defen·dant's argument, as well as the 
argument of plaintiffs in support of their position on 
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the mPrits of the cause, under descriptive headings 
chosen by plaintiffs rather than under the hea'dings 
of the defendant's brief. 
POINT I. 
THE SUl\Il\IARY JUDGMENT OF 'THE COURT BE-
LOW DETER'MINING THAT 'DEFE'NDAN'T HA·D NO 
RIGHT TO H.AUL SAI.lT OR OTHER MINERALS ON 
THE ROAD TRAVERSING PLAIN'TIF~S lJANDS, AN1D 
PERlVIANENTLY ENJOINING HIM FR,OM so DIOING 
IS CORREICT AND SHOULD 'BE SUSTAINED. 
Defendant bases his claim to a right to utilize 
the road tl'aversing plaintiffs' lands on three incon-
sistent theories. While none of the three theories is 
consistent with the others, it is apparently permis-
sible to proceed to hearing, un·der todays relaxed 
rules of pleading, without ever being compelled to 
make an election as to which theory is to be relied 
upon. However, while permitted to plea:d inconsis-
tently and submit proof which may support any of 
the inconsistent theories plead, it is still essential 
that the proved and admitted facts support one of 
the theories plead. This requirement defena'ant has 
been totally unable to meet. 
The theories upon which defendant relied are:-
1. That defendant has acquired :a precriptive 
right by more than thirty years use of the 
road adversely ·and hostilely to plaintiffs 
ownership. (R. 14-15 'Par. 2.) (AppelLant's 
Brief Point II.) -~ 
2. That the general public has use·d the road 
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for more than thirty years and that it is 
therefore a public road. ( R. 15 P~ar. 3, Ap-
pellant's Brief Point V.) 
3. That in some manner never explained by 
defen'dant a "way of necessity" exists. (R. 
114 P~ar. (d) Appellant's Brief P'oint III.) 
(Note: To the best of Plaintiff's knowl-
e'dge this -contention was not plead nor 
argued to the District Court by Defendant. 
H'owever, the Defendant now seeks to pre-
sent this contention in this Court, and since 
the theory is clearly not applicable to the 
·admitted facts under the law established 
in this State, we nevertheles:s present our 
views negatin'g this theory, even though 
we do not believe it to be properly presented 
by the defen·dant in this 'Court not having 
been first presented to the District Court.) 
None of the foregoing theories can be supported 
from the facts admitted by the defendant himself 
in his deposition. ( R. 15'9) The defendant in his 
brief attempts to raise an issue as to whether the 
lower court could correctly decide this case on sum-
m!ary ju·dgment an·d in so doing gives the impres-
sion that the lower court was guided solely by the 
plea·dings and affidavits. This is not the fact. The 
cases 'Cited by the defendant in support of his posi-
tion that a case may not 'be tried by afffdavit, and 
~h'at issues of fact cannot be ·determined on sum-
mary jud·gment if controverted have no bearing here 
10 
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for the defendant's deposition was taken, an·d the 
action of the district court is supported on the state-
ments the defendant himself made in his deposition. 
The attempt by counsel for defendant to make 
it appear that because the defendant's plea'dings 
are at issue with the :affidavits of the plaintiffs 
there is a cont1·overted issue of fact necessitating 
trial overlooks completely the fact tha;t the defendant 
himself in his deposition stated the facts upon which 
plaintiff relied for support of the Summ·ary Judg-
ment. ''r e are n'Ot here confronted with an area 
of the law in which there is doubt, or va:gu·eness of 
effect or ap·plication to 'the facts. T h is ·C o u r t 
has spoken, an·d clearly defined the requisites for 
the acquisition of rights to traverse the land of an-
other. Applying the law as pronounced by this Court 
to the facts admitted by the defen·dant in ·his depo-
sition taken in this case it is clear th·at the defen-
dant has not acquired any right to 'the use of the 
road in question for any purp·ose. Summ1ary judg-
ment procedure is so entirely suitable to this case 
that it is almost a classic text ·book situation for 
its use. This Coutt has so recognized and defined 
the law and rules of court relating to Summ:ary 
Judgment. We refer to the ·case of Dupler v. Yates, 
10 U2d 251, 351 P2d 624, wherein near~y an iden-
tical situation prevailed. There fue movant for sum-
mary judgment did precisely what plaintiffs do in 
this case, relied upon the statements of ·the adver-
sary made in the adversaries deposition an·d by 
11 
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which the adversary was bound, and this Court com-
mented:-
"* * * In contrast to self-serving declarations 
usually proffered by movants for summ~ary 
judgment, these statements are made by the 
parties themselves. * * *" (351 P2d 624 at 
636-6.) 
The Court then concluded in its opinion at page 
636 of the Pacific reports :-
"The primary purpose of the summary judg-
ment procedure is to pierce the allegations of 
the pleadings, show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, although :an issue may 
be raised by the pleadings, and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a mat-
ter of law. * * *" 
T'his Court re-affirmed this position in the case 
of Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 14 U2d 
101, 377 P2d 1010 wherein the Court stated:-
"* * * Summary judgments can properly be 
granted under Rule 56(c) only if 'the plead-
ings, depositions, an,d admissions on file to-
gether with the affidavits, if any,' which are 
offered, show without dispute that the party 
is entitled to prevail. This 'Condition is obvious-
ly not met if the allegations of the plaintiff's 
complaint stand in opposition to the averments 
of the affidavits so that there are controvert-
ed issues of fact, the determination of which 
is necessary to settle the rights of the parties. 
The trial judge correctly ruled that th~re 
were such issues of fact here. The cases rehed 
upon by the defendant are distinguisha~le, 
since an admittedly different sitwation extSts 
where the averments in the affidavits or facts 
12 
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shown by depositions and or exhibits would 
indisptttably resolve the material facts. * * *" 
(emphasis ours) 
Proceeding then to an examination of the facts 
and of the law upon which the lower court granted 
plaintiffs' motion for Summary Judgment we find 
that the law applicable to the situation here pre-
~Pnted was expounded in this state in the Case of 
Jlorris 1'. Blunt, 49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127 and has 
been repeatedly re-affirmed by this Court. The fac-
tual situation in the Morris v. Blunt case as stated 
by the court involved nearly the same situation as 
that here presented. 
"The defendants admit that plaintiff owns the 
land in question but they claim a right of way 
across a part of said land for themselves, and 
that the roadway so used by them is a public 
highway. * * *" ( 161 P. at 1128.) 
So too in the instant case the ownership of the 
lands traversed by the roads is not in issue. As an 
outgrowth of a hearing involving the bond required 
of the defendant the lower court made an express 
finding on this matter which finding has never at 
any time been put in issue by the defendant or raised 
on appeal from said Findings and judgment, and 
was in fact included by the defendant in the amend-
ments to the findings which the defendant made. 
(R31Par.1) 
We now quote at length from the opinion in Mor-
ris v. Bl1tnt because the Court there sets out 'all of 
the determinative criteria 'by which the contentions 
13 
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of the defendant as to the public highway and pre-
scriptive easement are to be evaluated. 
"* * * They rely upon three grounds to hold 
the road in question, to wit: ( 1) That by long 
continual use it has become a public highway; 
(2) that by their and Mrs. Kersey's use they 
have an easement by prescription; ( 3) that 
said road was gran ted by said deed, both by 
the description of a road one rod wide, speci-
ally described, and also by reason of said road 
being appurtenant to the land conveyed in the 
deed. We will examine these questions in 
order: 
First, that by long continual use the 20 
rods of road in question has become a public 
highway; that is, that there has been a dedi-
cation by the owner to the public use and an 
acceptance by the public. 
[1] A dedication rests primarily in the 
intent of the owner. There must be a conces-
sion intentionally made by him, which may be 
proved by declarations or by acts, or may be 
inferred from circumstances. No form or cere-
mony is necessary. It must, however, appear 
that he knew of the use by the public, and in-
tended to grant the right of way to the pub-
lic. No formal ~acceptance by any public offi-
cer or agent is necessary, but there must be 
actual use by the public. City of Cincinnati v. 
White, 6 Pet. 440, 8 L. Ed. 452; Morgan v. 
Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 723, 24 L. Ed. 743; 
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah, 227, 26 
Pac. 291; Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah, 
240, 51 Pac. 980; Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah, 
305, 64 Pac. 955; Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 
27 Utah, 252, 75 Pac. 620; Wilson v. Hull, 7 
Utah, 90, 24 Pac. 799. 
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r2, 3] From the evidence, it ~appears th~at 
the p1ain'tiff, 2 years ·before the commence-
ment of this action, plowed the road to the 
canal bank; 'that frequently in plowing lands 
adjoining the road plaintiff rolled boulders 
from the land into the roa·d, which the de-
fendants removed 'before they coul1d travel the 
road; th·at plaintiff closed the road extending 
west from the Kersey crossing 5 years before 
the commencement of this action ; that a wire 
gate was place·d by the plaintiff a'cross the en-
trance to the road on the east section line 7 
years 'before the commencement of this :action; 
and that the road was plowed by fthe plaintiff 
as much ~as 10 years before the commencement 
of this action. 
All these facts negative an intention on 
the pa~t of the plaintiff to dedica1te to public 
use. On 1the contrary, the fair inferen'ce to be 
drawn from them is that he intended not to 
dedicate the roadway to the public. I1t is true 
that, a dedication by the owner and an accept-
ance by the public on!ce made, the ·highway 
thus established continues to be a 'highway as 
long as the public use continues; and if in 
this case the public use were sufficient to con-
stitute an acceptance and the owner h:a'd in 
fact intended to dedicate, then the ·dedieation 
would be complete; bult we think there is no 
evidence tending to show that there ever was 
an intent to de'dicate to pu'bli'c use. 
[ 4-6] ~ext we m~st co?sider t~e people 
~ho us~d this roa·d. Dl'd the1~ traveling upon 
It. const1ftute a use by the public? Tihe evidence 
disclose~ three cl'ass~s of persons only who 
used this road, 'to Wit, the occupants of the 
Kersey place and their visitors, the workmen 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon the canal, and some persons who lived in 
the middle of the section. 
As to the occupants of the Kersey place 
they had an express grant of a right of way 
for ingress and egress contained in their title 
deed (not considerin·g now the extent or limi-
tation of the rirght conveyed in the deed), so 
they were not travelin·g the road by reason 
of its public character, 'but under the expres'S 
provision of their deed. 
As to the workmen upon the c:anal, they 
were there under the right by ''user'' claimed 
by their company. The right of way for their 
canal, whatever it is, if it authorizes the occu-
pancy of the land for canal purposes, carries 
with it the right, un·der reasonable limitations 
to enter the preml.ses to construct, repair, and 
operate the ·canal, rts headgates, its laterals, 
etc., which are a part of or connected there-
with. So !these persons were not on this road 
by reason of its public character, but under 
whatever right by "user" the can:al company 
had over this land for canal purposes. 
As to the persons who lived in the center 
of the section, the evidence 'doe's not disclose 
how many there are or ever were, how fre-
quently they used the road, by what right they 
traveled the road, nor the circumstances of 
their use, nor that they h:ave in any way im-
proved their property depen·ding upon t~e 
public use of the road, nor th~at they are 1n 
any respect so situated that 'Closing the road 
will be an injury to them. Compare the case 
made as to 1them with the situation disclosed 
in the case of ·Schettler v. Lynch, '2'3 'Utah, 
305, 64 Rae. 955. 
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However, the people in the middle of this 
section are not in court, and their rights are 
not being determined. Their u~e of the roa1d 
is tnaterial here only so far as It may ·have a 
bearing upon its public chara·cter, 1and the 
l'Yidence as to their use of the road in ques-
tion is very meager. 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, § 1115, 
provides: 
''A highway shall be deemed to 'have 'been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the pub-
lic when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 
'~A "thoroughfare" is a place or way 
through which there is passing or travel. It 
becomes a "public thoroughfare" when the 
public have a general right of p·assage. Un-
der this statute the highway, even though it 
be over privately owned grouna, will 'be deem-
ed dedicated or abandoned to the public use 
when the public has con'tinuously used it as a 
thoroughfare for 'a period of 10 years, but 
such use must be by the ~public. Use under 
private right is not sufficient. If the through-
fare is laid out or used as 'a private way, its 
use, however long, as a private way, does not 
make it a public way; and the mere fact that 
the public also m'ake use of it, without objec-
tion from the owner of the land, will not make 
it a public way. ·Before it ~becomes public in 
Character the owner of the land must consent 
to the change. EITiott, Roads and Streets, § 5. 
From a consideration of the facts in evi-
dence, viewed in the li·ght of the well-establis·h-
ed principles of law, we must conclude as ·did 
the trial court, that there is disclosed ~o such 
17 
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intention on the part of the owner of the land 
to dedicate to public use, nor such use by the 
pu·blic constituting an acceptance as is neces-
sary to show a dedication or abandonment 
to public use. 
[!] The secon~ contention of the appel-
lants 1s that by their and Mrs. Kersey's use 
they have an easement by prescription. 
'''The right to a public road or private 
way by prescription arises from the uninter-
rupted adverse enjoyment of it under a claim 
of right known to the owner for the requisite 
length of time. Anciently the right to the ease-
ment arose by prescription from the use of 
the land for so long a time that there was no 
existing evidence as to when such use com-
menced. Its origin must ·have ·been at a time 
'Whereof the memory of m·an runneth not to 
the contrary.' Later the rule was changed by 
limiting the time of uninterrupted possession 
to 20 years.'' Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 
U~tah, 2'2·9, 26 Pac. 2H2. 
"Prescription refers the right to the high-
way to the presumption that it was originally 
established pursuant to law, by proper auth-
ority; while dedication refers it to a contract 
either expressed or implied. Dedication iJ?-
plies a conveyance and an acceptance, w~Ile 
prescription requires an unbroken possession 
or use under claim of right." Elliott, Roads 
and Streets, § 191. 
A prescriptive right to an easement do~s 
n·ot arise in 7 years, by an·alogy to the proVI-
sion of the statute barring an action to re-
cover real property when the· person assert-
in·g ti tie was not seized or possessed of the 
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property in question within 7 years. These 
statutes do not apply to rights of way or any 
other class of easement by prescription. The 
right by prescription can only a~ise by. a'd-
verse use and enJoyment under cla1m of r1ght 
uninterrupted and continuous for a period of 
20 years. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah, 
227 26 Pac. 291; Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah, 
238: 61 Pac. 1006; North Point Co. v. U. & S. 
L. Co., 16 Utah, 271, 52 Pac. 16'8, 40 L. ?· A. 
851, 67 Am. St. Rep. 607; Lund v. W1lcox, 
34 Utah, 205, 97 Pac. 33. 
[8] A prescriptive right in the public is 
disposed of by our conclusion, heretofore 
reached, that the evidence does not show use 
by the public, and that this was not a public 
highway; but there is still the question of a 
private right of way by prescription. Under 
the well-established rule, the use, in order 
that it may ripen into a prescriptive title, 
must, in .any case, not only be adverse and 
continuous, an'd under claim of right for a 
period of 20 years, but it must be uninter-
rupted throughout that period. In the case at 
bar the use of the defendants and their prede-
cessors commenced in 1887, at which time 
there \Yas a severance of the title to the par-
cels of land, and could not ripen into title by 
prescription until 1907. But the defendants' 
own testimony shows that the plaintiff plow-
ed the road in question as early as 1904, and 
from that time to the commencement of this 
action the plaintiff, from time to time, placed 
~~k.s in the road, from the plowed land ad-
JOining, and that the defendants, with shovels 
leveled the ground and removed the rocks t~ 
the .north to make the road passable ; and fol-
loWing these acts, and clearly indicatin'g the 
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attitude of each of the parties to this suit to 
the claim of the defendants to the ownership 
of this right of way at about the time the 
20-year period would ~have expired, plaintiff 
placed :a wire gate across the road at the point 
where it left the public highway, and the de-
fendants cut it down. From these circum-
stances we conclude that the use was not un-
interrupted, ·and that no right by prescrip-
tion could arise under these circumstances. 
Wasatc·h Irrig. Co. v. Fulton, 23 Utah, 466 
6'5 Pac. 205; Crosier v. Brown, 66 W. va: 
273, 66 S. E. 326, 25 L. R. A. (N. S,) 174; 
Reid v. Garnett, 101 Va. 4·7, 4'3 ·s. E. 182; 
Wooldridge v. Coughlin, 4'6 W. Va. 345, 33 
S. E. 23'3. 
Comparin·g the facts :testified to by the defen-
dant in his deposition in this ~case with the facts and 
the law in the case qudted, there is no basis upon 
wh1i~ch defendant's claims m1ay be supported. We find 
that the defen'dant admits tllat he had never hauled 
any salt or other product in trucks across the land of 
phtin'tiffs until one year and a ihalf before the taking 
of his 'deposition. (R 159. 10 Lines 17, 18; P. 14 
Lines 17-21, P. 21 Lines ·24-30 P. 2·2 Lines 1-4 
He at one time hauled some salt from a Mr. 
T·homas but ;had no ide·a ·how much an·d it was for a 
short time. '(R. 159 P. 14 Lines 17-22) The de-
fendant filed an affidavit of his attorney W. H. 
Henderson, in which Mr. Hen·derson points out that 
Thomas was a lessee of the plaintiff Gillmors during 
the period of time of his operation there and at-
taches as exhibits to the affidavit copies of the 
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hotnas lease with the Plaintiff, Gillmors. (R. 96, 
r) Some effort is made by the defendant's coun-
!l to claim that because the lease with plaintiff 
illmors did not make express mention of the use 
r the road in question, that Thom·as's use of th~ 
Jad could be assumed to be without permission of 
1e plaintiffs and that this was evidence of an ad-
erse use or the public character of the road. This 
osition does not give credence to the established 
1w, long recognized that a lessee's acts are permis-
ive and not hostile to the owner. 
"Moreover, sin·ce an easement by prescrip-
tion rests upon the presumption of a grant, 
the period during which the owner of ·a tract 
claimed to be dom·inant was in possession of 
it as a tenant of the owner of a tract claimed 
to be servient cannot be considered as ·a part 
of the prescriptive period. Thus, the time dur-
ing which a tenant uses a way over adjoining 
property of his landlord, while he holds land 
as the tenant of the latter, cannot be counted, 
as against the landlord, as a part of the pre-
scriptive period in establis·hing an easement. 
* * *" 32 Am. Jur. Landlord & Tenant - P. 
46, Sec. 23. 
Furthermore, the 'defendant offered no proof 
Jf any nature, 'by affidavit, deposition or otherwise 
Jf any privity between himself and Thomas. 
Under the doctrines announced in the case of 
l/orris v. Bl1tnt, above quoted, the defendant, clear-
ly, by his own testimony, has not acquired a pre-
scriptive right to haul salt or other minerals across 
the lands of plaintiffs for he has not don·e so for 
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the pres'criptive period of twenty years and he has 
never done so adversely, except for the few months 
between the date of the letter of plaintiffs' October 
16th, 196'1 demanding that he cease using the road 
(R 15'9 P. 34 L. 2·2-30, P. 85 L. 1-7) to his use under 
bond by order of the court given in this case, a 
space of only 7 months. (R 159 P. 3'5 Lines 1-7, 
1'5-17) 
Any conten1tion tha:t the road was a public road 
is put at rest under the announced criteria of the 
Blunt case, by the defendant's own statements 
wherein he admits that he has found a closed gate 
near the Gillmor corrals on the road, (R 159 p. 14 
lines 26-30) signs declaring the road to be for 
the use of landowners and gun club members only 
(R 159 P. 28 lines 8-20 an·d p. 29, line 1) a watch-
man who bars the road to all except those who can 
identify themselves as having perm'issi'on to go 
through the gate (R 159 p. 28 lines 21-24, P. 15 
lines '15-30 p. 16 lines 1-10) all of whi'ch is totally 
inconsistent with any dedication of the road to thr. 
public by the owner. 
The claim of public road fails for another reas-
on as well, and that is the failure to submit any evi-
den,ce of the public actually making use of the road. 
The defendant referred to use by only such people 
as the "State" to go out to Antelope Island (R 159 
p. 29 L. 10) Mr. Thomas who had a salt lease (R 
9, 94) the mosquito abatement people (R 159 P. 
29 L. 6-7) and some unidentified rabbit hunters, 
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rho so far as the defendant testified may have been 
utright trespassers (R 159 P. 29 L. 17) and some 
eople who maintain the canal (R. 159 P. 2'9 L. 29) 
,he Court in the Morris v. Blunt case discussed 
ll of these uses and concluded that such a showing 
·ould not support a claim that this was a use by 
he public. 
Plaintiffs have chosen to set fotth the facts and 
he law in the argument on this claim that the road 
~'as public, despite the fact that the court below gave 
s its announced reason for its decision on ~his point 
he dis1nissal with prejudice of t:he Salt Lake 'County 
a\vsnit to declare this road a public road which it 
onsidered made the matter res judicata. We wish 
lO uncertainty as to whether the defendant could 
.ave proved this to be a public road if given the op-
~ortunity. Forgetting the fact that the County S:uit 
eeking to establish this road as a public road was 
.ismissed with prejudice, the lower court coul1d have 
orrectly found it was not a public road :based on 
he facts as given by the defendant himself under 
he recognized law announced in Morris vs. Blunt 
hove quoted. 
Since the matter of prescriptive right and pub-
tc road have been disposed of as above set forth, 
his then leaves to the defen·dant only one remaining 
heory by which he claimed a right across the land 
f plaintiffs. This third and last theory is a way of 
ecessity. As previously indicated this was not argu-
d to the lower court, nor plead, and is first su1b-
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mitted in this court. But recognizing that it is· 
better to consider the substance than to stand on 
technicalities we wish to point out ito the court that 
the law in regard to establis·hment of ways of neces-
sity is clear and unequivocal. This Court in the case 
of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 U. 2·2, 1917 P2d 117 set 
out the requirements for estalJlishment of a way of 
necessi'ty quoting the case of Morris v. Blunt, as 
follows:-
"* * * The requirements for a way of neces-
sity are set out in the case of Morris v. Blunt, 
49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127, 1132, as follows:-
'(1) Unity of ·title followed by severance; 
C2) That at the time of the severance the 
servitude was apparent, obvious and visible; 
( 3) That the easement is reason:ably neces-
sary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; 
and 
( 4) It must usually be continuous and self-
acting, as distinguished from one used only 
from time to time when occasion arises.' * * *" 
In the same case the Court continues a little further 
on in the opinion, 
"* * * The distinction between a way of neces-
sity and a prescriptive right is set out in Ber-
tolina v. Frates, 89 U 2'38, 57 P2id 346, 3150, 
as follows: 'Ways of necessity arise by virtue 
of conditions entirely different from ways 
created by prescription. A prescriptive right 
can be acquired by anyone. It may be appur-
ten·ant or in gross. There need be no connec-
tion so far as the chain of title is concerned 
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between servient and dominant estates, but 
ways of necessity exist only where the title 
. f ' * * *" springs rom a common source. 
In the instant case the defen·dant admits that 
he owns no property served by the road in question. 
(R 159 P. 3 L. 14-18) Defendant attempts to claim 
through the state lease he holds on the salt lands off 
Antelope Island, but there is no possibility of com-
pliance with the conditions above set forth requisite 
to creation of a way of necessity an·d the physical 
facts shown by the map attached as an exhibit to 
the defendants deposition (R 1'59) clearly demon-
strate the physical impossibility of mee'ting the re-
quisites. 
Having examined the defendants three theories 
by which he claimed a right across lan·ds of the plain-
tiffs in the light of his own statemen1ts 'Contained in 
his deposition and the law applicable thereto, we 
submit that the Summary judgment entered by the 
lower court denying to the defendant the right to 
use the road traversing plaintiffs' lands for the haul-
ing of salt or other minerals should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE DEICISION OF THE LOWER COURT RE-
SERVING FOR FUTURE TRIAL TIHE QUESTI10N 'OF 
WHETHER THE D'E'FENDANT HAD A RIGHT TO 
PERSONALLY CROSS PLAINTIFFS LAN'DS IN A PAS-
SENGER CAR, J·EEP OR 'PANEL TRUCK TO GET TO 
THE SHORE OF GREAT SALT LAKE FO·R THE PUR-
POSE OF MAKING MINERAL SURVEY'S IS ERRION-
EOUS AND THE COURT SH·OULD HAVE ENTERE'D 
ITS ·JUDGMENT DENYING THIS RIGHT TO TH'E DE-
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FENDANT, AND ENJO~INING FURTHER TRESPASS 
BY D'E1FE'NDANT ON LAND1S OF PLAINTIF1FS. 
The lower court out of an abundance of caution 
' and we believe based upon a misinterpretation of 
the recently handed down decision on Summary 
Judgments in the case of Christensen v. Financial 
Service Co., 14 U 2'd 101, 377 P·2d 1010, reserved 
the question, as containing a disputed issue of fact, 
of whether or not defendant ·had acquired a person-
al right to cross the lands of the plaintiffs in a pas-
senger car, jeep or panel truck for the purpose of 
getting to the shore of Great Salt Lake and there 
making tests of the mineral content of the water 
and shore lands. The defendant's counse1 argued 'that 
sin·ce defendant in his complaint 'claimed to have 
used the road traversing plaintiffs lan1ds for thirty 
years for this purpose that an issue of fact was 
created desplite the fact that the statement in the 
complaint was not born out by the defendant's dep-
osition. The lower court expressed the view that 
under the doctrine of the C·hristensen case, above 
referred to, that if an issue was raised by the plead-
ings lthe issue could not 'be resolved by affidavit 
or deposition We do not so read the Christensen 
case. A deposition constitutes the testimony of the 
party whose ·de·position is taken. He may not change 
his story without challenge and impeachmen1t in the 
trial court. Neither by affidavit or in any other 
manner has the defen·dant in this case indicated 
any de'Sire to change his story from that taken in 
the deposition. The facts to which the defendant 
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testified clearly show that as a matter of law he 
has no right to use the road traversing the lands 
of the plaintiffs for any purpose whatever. 
The defendant in his deposition admitted that 
when he used the road in question he found gates 
thereon, and that they were usually closed and that 
he \vithout exception always re-closed them. (R 159 
I). 14 line 26) 
Q. During that period of time, Mr. Car-
ter, have you ever observed that the road is 
closed by gates at several points where it 
crosses through the Gillmor lands? 
A. I have observed gates at a point 
close by their sheds there on some occasions, 
yes, in the spring. 
Q. And those gates have been up or 
down as the case might be when you got there? 
A. Ye·s. 
Q. Have you ever taken them down 
yourself to go through? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And have you replaced them as you 
went through? 
A. You bet. 
R 159 P. 19 Lines 9-30 inc. P. 20 Lines 1-9 inc. 
Q. Now how many times in a year 
would you go out this road Mr. ·Carter? 
A. ,,~ell al1l during the year. That is the 
purp~se of st~dying the minerals in there, 
especially sodium sulp·hate, the con·dition 
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where it makes its deposits. The salt makes 
its depositions in the summer and fall and 
the sodium sulphate makes its depositions in 
the winter and is picked back up in the sum-
mer :as weather conditions change, so I made 
a study on it for the amount there. You would 
have to make periodic trips about all during 
the winter and summer months to study this 
kind of stuff. 
Q. How many times are we talking 
about? 
A. I am talking about 12, 15 times a 
year to go out there. 
Q. And this once again is just for your 
personal transportation? In other words, you 
aren't hauling any equipment or using big 
trucks? 
A. We use some equipment. It isn't 
heavy, it isn't 'big trucks, usually panel trucks 
or jeeps with ,a box on it that you could carry 
augers in and test tubes or bottles to obtain 
samples. 
Q. An·d at any time that you have gone 
out there during the winter or early spring 
you generally found the gate approximately 
here next to the Gillmor property closed, have 
you not, ~and had to take it down and put it 
back up? 
A. At the point that is circled there, 
yes. (On map attached as exhibit to the depo-
sition which point is near the center of section 
2'2 and circled and m,arked in ink Duck Club 
Gate - our explanation) There is a gate 
there, a 'good gate, and it is usually closed. 
I have saw it when it wasn't ;and I have taken 
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occasion to stop when I went through there 
and closed it because there is a sign on the 
gate that says, "Please keep the gate closed" 
and "Thank you"; and I being a stockman, 
\vhy I recognized the fact that the stock could 
get out." 
Again the defendant recognized the dominion 
and ownership of the ·plain'~iffs when ·he sought per-
nlission from Gillmors and from Mr. Olwell of the 
I~land Ranching Company to use the road. (R 159 
P. 39 L. 1-11 inc. P. 17 lines r5-28 inc.) The use 
thus described by defendant himself certainly does 
not meet the standards set by this court for attain-
ment of a right by prescription This court said in 
the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 U. 4'81, 39 P2d 
1073, 
"* * * A twenty year use alone of a way 
is not sufficient to establish an easement. 
Mere use of a roadway opened by a landown-
er for his own purposes will be presumed per-
missiYe. An 'antagonistic or adverse use of a 
way cannot spring from a permissive use. A 
prescriptive title must be acquired :adversely. 
It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a 
license or mere neighborly accommodation. 
Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive 
user. If the use is accompanied by 'any recog-
nition in express terms or by implication of 
a right in the landowner to stop such use now 
or at some time in the future the use is not 
adverse. * * *" Cited with approval in the 
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case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 U. 22, 19'7 P2d 
117 at 11213. 
Again in the case of Lunt v. Kitchens t2·3 U 488 
260 p 2d 535. 
''* * * T·he use by the Kitchenses added no bur-
den to the driveway; they did not :attempt to 
widen it, nor to interfere with fue use by the 
W eidners. Where a person opens the way for 
use of his own premises and another uses it 
without interfering wi~th the landowner's use 
or causing him damage, the presumption is 
that the use was rpermissive and in the absence 
of proof to the contrary, the person so using 
it does not ,acquire a right of way by prescrip-
tion. * * *" 
In the instant case the use by defendant for ob-
taining samplings at the lake shore falls e~actly 
into the categories here set out and delineated in the 
cases ci1ted as permissive. An1d this is borne out by 
defendant's asking permission of the owners as well 
as his recognition of ~the landowners gates and re-
quest th~at they be kept shut. In view of these cir-
cumstances, wh'ich cannot be altered by testimony 
of others, we submit the lower court should have 
found tha;t the defendant had not acquired any pre-
scriptive right against the plaintiffs and should 
h·ave granted an injunction permanently barring 
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POINT III. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE LOWER c~OURT 
CORRECTLY GRANTED PLAINTI'FFS REQUEST FOR 
I~CI~EASE OF BOND AND ORDERE~D ·DEFENDANT 
TO REMAIN OFF THE ROAD OR p·osT A '$100,000 
BOND IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS CO'URT 
FOR CONSIDERATI'ON. 
On August 1st, 1963, just prior to hearing of 
the case on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment the defendant fi1ed a Notice of Motion for 
\·acation of an Order of the Court which had then 
been in effect from the 11th day of March 19'63 by 
the terms of which defendant was barred from use 
of the road unless he posted a $100,000 bond. No 
protest was m~ade by defendant at the time of the 
granting of this order. The hearing on the bond was 
before the Honorable Stewart M. H1anson, Judge. 
4
-\.t the hearing of plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, the defendant attempted to argue his 
tnotion to vacate the order. This the Court :declined 
to hear since under the rules of the District Court 
one judge will ndt review the action nf ~another judge 
of the same district in the absence of special cir-
cumstances, and there were no such circumstances 
shown here. This was explained by the ·court to the 
counsel for defendant who made no objection there-
to. In fact counsel indicated that the decision by the 
court on the matter Of the defendant's right to use 
of the road rendered moot ~this question, and it so 
remains at this juncture. If the decision of this 
court sustains the holding of the lower court 'bar-
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ring the defendant from use of the road, this matter 
is moot and of no concern. If the decision of this 
court should reverse the decision of the lower court 
and remand the case for further proceedings, then 
the lower court would be the proper forum in which 
to determine any issue on the bond. 
CON·CLUSIION 
T·he defendant is an opportunist. Wi1Jhout in-
vestment by the defendant, by imposing on the pfain-
tiffs and usurping their lan·ds bought, paid for and 
maintained by them, and upon which they pay taxes 
so th'at they may use them in their livestock busi-
ness as they see fit, the defen'dant seeks to conduct 
a business profi'table to himself. l't is against such 
adventurers that the courts lhave long stood as the 
bulwark, protecting the property and rights of the 
owners a·gainst those who without righ't or respon-
si'bili1ty would appropri:a:te the benefits. 'The deci-
sion of the lower court denying to defendant the 
~right to haul sal't or other mineral across the lands 
of plaintiffs and permanently enjoining him from 
the use of 'illle s·ubje·ct road in so ·doing should be 
affirmed. In so far as the decision of the lower court 
reserved for future tri:al the question of defendant's 
claim to a prescriptive easement over the lands of 
the pl~aintiffs for transportation by passenger car, 
jeep or panel truck for the conducting of mineral· 
ogica'l surveys of the lake, the decision should be 
reversed 'and rem:ande·d with instructions to the court 
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to enter judgment denying to the defendant any 
right to traverse the lands of the plaintiffs for any 
purpose whatever, an:d ·perm,anently enjoining the 
defendant from further use of the road traversin·g 
plaintiffs lan·ds. 
Respe·ctfully submitted, 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
Suite 604 - '315 East 2nd South 
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